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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
BARBARA LYNN BUNCH,
Case No. 930707-CA

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Priority No. 15

BRIAN LYNN ENGLEHORN,
Defendant/Appellee.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1953, as amended).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Plaintiff has appealed an order by the Fifth District
Court, Iron County, State of Utah which dismissed Plaintiff's
complaint with prejudice and on the merits, and allowed the
Defendant the opportunity to request attorney fees.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the Trial Court properly hold that Utah Code Ann.

Sec. 30-1-4.5(2) (1953, as amended), cannot be applied to the
relationship of these parties to give rise to a valid statutory
unsolemnized marriage?
2.

Does the Court of Appeals lack jurisdiction in this

matter because Appellant did not timely pay the Court filing fees?
3.

Is

the

"Judgment

of

Dismissal

appealable order?

1

with

Prejudice"

an

4.

May Appellant Bunch raise issues for the first time on

appeal?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues before the Court center on whether the Trial Court
properly applied the law in ruling that Plaintiff's claim of a
common-law marriage must be dismissed pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Sec. 30-1-4.5(2) (1953, as amended), in ruling that Defendant is
entitled to ask for attorney fees pursuant to Sec. 78-27-56 (1953,
as amended), whether the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction in
these matters, and whether Bunch may raise issues for the first
time

on appeal.

Questions

of

These

issues

law are reviewed

all raise questions
under a correctness

standard, giving no deference to the Trial Court.

of law.
of error
Hales v.

Industrial Com'n of Utah, 854 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah App. 1993);
Velarde v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Com'n, 831 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah
App. 1992); Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203 (Utah App. 1991).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5
Validity of marriage not solemnized.
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this
chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative order
establishes that it arises out of a contract between two consenting
parties who:
(a) are capable of giving consent;
(b) are legal capable of entering a solemnized marriage under
the provisions of this chapter;
(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations;
and
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform
and general reputation as husband and wife.
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(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under
this section must occur during the relationship described in
Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination of
that relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable under this
section may be manifested in any form, and may be proved under the
same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases.
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 21-7-3
Impecunious litigants - Affidavit.
Any person may institute, prosecute, defend and appeal any
cause in any court in this state by taking and subscribing, before
any officer authorized to administer an oath, the following:
I,A B, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that owing to my poverty
I am unable to bear the expenses of the action or legal proceedings
which I am about to commence (or the appeal which I am about to
take), and that I verily believe I am justly entitled to the relief
sought by such action, legal proceedings or appeal.
Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which
an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to
the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall
be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the
date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. However,
when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry
or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule
3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
Rule 6, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Bond for costs on appeal.
Except in a criminal case, at the time of filing the notice of
appeal, the appellant shall file with the notice a bond for costs
on appeal, unless the bond is waived in writing by the adverse
party, or unless an affidavit as provided for in Section 21-7-3,
Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended, is filed. The bond shall be in the
sum of at least $300.00 or such greater amount as the trial court
may order on motion of the appellee to ensure payment of costs on
appeal. No separate bond for costs on appeal is required when a
supersedeas bond is files.
The bond on appeal shall be with
sufficient sureties and shall be conditioned to secure payment of
costs if the appeal is dismissed or the judgment affirmed, or of
such costs as the appellate court may award if the judgment is
3

modified. The adverse party may except to the sufficiency of the
sureties in accordance with the provisions of Rule 62(i), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 54(a) and (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form.
"Judgment" as used in these rules
includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a
master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court
may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than
all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Barbara Lynn Bunch

("Bunch") filed a complaint

against Appellee Brian Lynn Englehorn ("Englehorn") alleging a
common law marriage pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5 (1953,
as amended) and asking for a divorce.

She did not request a

judicial determination as to existence of a "marriage" at any time.
Englehorn filed an answer denying any entitlement to a divorce.
The matter came on for trial more than a year after Bunch and
Englehorn terminated their "relationship".

At trial, counsel for

Englehorn moved the Court to dismiss the action pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5(2) because more than a year had elapsed
since the termination of the relationship. The Trial Court granted
4

Englehorn's motion on that basis.

The Court also ruled that

Englehorn could ask for attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Sec. 78-27-56 (1953, as amended). Bunch filed a Notice of Appeal,
but did not pay the requisite Court filing fee.
alleged impecuniosity.

She instead

Englehorn challenged the validity of the

impecuniosity claims and petitioned the Court to strike the Notice
of Appeal, and dismiss the appeal on the basis that no filing fee
was submitted with the Notice of Appeal. The District Court denied
Englehorn's motion.

Bunch now raises various arguments never

presented to the Trial Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Englehorn accepts Bunch's statement of facts as accurate for
the purposes of argument.

In addition thereto, Englehorn submits

the following facts regarding Englehorn's appeal of the District
Court's "Memorandum Opinion and Order" executed by the Honorable J.
Philip Eves, on or about April 14, 1994:
1.

On November 10, 1993 Bunch filed a "Notice of Appeal"

with the Fifth District Court appealing the "Judgment of Dismissal
with Prejudice" of the Honorable J. Philip Eves entered October 12,
1993.

(Record on Appeal p. 000117) Bunch did not pay the requisite

filing fee in connection with the filing of the Notice of Appeal,
nor

did

she

impecuniosity

file

a

cost

and filed an

bond

required,

"Affidavit of

but

alleged

her

Impecuniosity" with

"Affidavit Supporting Impecuniosity Request" on November 10, 1993.
(Record on Appeal p.p. 000118-000122)
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2.

Thereafter, because of deficiencies in the purported

"Affidavit

of

Impecuniosity"

and

the

purported

"Affidavit

Supporting Impecuniosity Request" dated November 5, 1993, Bunch
purported to file another purported "Affidavit of Impecuniosity"
and another "Affidavit Supporting Impecuniosity Request", these
documents being filed with the Fifth District Court on December 29,
1993.

(Record on Appeal p.p. 000126-000132)
3.

On January 12, 1993 an "Affidavit" of Teresa Sunderland

was filed with the Fifth District Court.

(Record on Appeal p.p.

00158-00166) Affiant, Teresa Sunderland, stated in her affidavit
that she was a notary public of the State of Utah; and that on or
about

November

8,

1983,

an

individual

identified

through

documentation to be Barbara L. Bunch, appeared before her.
4.

At that time, Barbara L. Bunch signed a document entitled

"Affidavit

of

Impecuniosity"

and

Supporting Impecuniosity Request".

another

entitled

"Affidavit

Although Bunch signed the

documents before the notary, Bunch did not raise her hand, and did
not swear an oath. The notary did not administer an oath to Bunch,
did not personally know Barbara Lynn Bunch, and identified her only
by her Utah driver's license, No. 14616368. (Record on Appeal p.p.
00158-00159)
5.

This matter came before the Court of Appeals upon

Englehorn's 17 December, 1993 "Motion to Strike" Bunch's "Affidavit
of Impecuniosity", and "Motion to Dismiss the Appeal".

(See Court

Records) On December 28, 1993 Bunch filed a memorandum in response
to Englehorn's December 17, 1993 motion.
6

(See Court Records) The

matter was temporarily remanded to the Fifth District Court, Iron
County, for consideration of Englehorn's motions.

(Record on

Appeal p. 00168)
6.

On April 14, 1994 the Fifth District Court, Iron County,

issued a "Memorandum Opinion and Order" denying Englehorn's "Motion
to Strike Notice of Appeal" and
(Record on Appeal p. 00211)

"Motion to Dismiss Appeal".

On April 28, 1994 Appellee filed a

"Notice of Appeal" appealing the "Memorandum Opinion and Order".
(Record on Appeal p. 00217)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The institution of marriage is a creation of statute and is
subject to regulation by its Legislature.

For decades the Utah

Legislation chose to allow marriage only if solemnized by an
authorized person.

However, with the passing of Utah Code Ann.

Sec. 30-1-4.5 in 1987 the Legislature authorized recognition of
common-law marriages if certain conditions were met.
Ann.

Sec.

30-1-4.5(2)

provides

that

the

Utah Code

determination

or

establishment of marriage by a Court or administrative order must
occur during the relationship described in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 301-4.5(1) or within one year following the termination of that
relationship.

In the case at bar no determination or decree was

obtained within one year from the termination of the relationship,
thus the Trial Court was correct in dismissing Bunch's complaint
with prejudice and on the merits.
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In her effort to appeal the decision of the District Court,
Bunch failed timely to pay the Court filing fee. This invalidates
the appeal.
The "Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice" is not a final
order and therefore not appealable.
Bunch may not raise arguments on appeal which were not
presented to the Trial Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IF THE STATE LEGISLATURE CAN REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE A COMMON-LAW
MARRIAGE, THEN IT CAN SET FORTH THE REQUIREMENTS TO ESTABLISH A
COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE.
The power to regulate marriage is a right reserved exclusively
to the respective states.

In re Ann Goalen, 512 P.2d 1028, 1030

(Utah 1973); Baehr V. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (1993); In re the
Marriage of Frank, 542 P.2d 845, 850 (1975); Singer V. Hara, 522
P.2d 1187, 1197 (1974).

The Court in Baehr stated:

"By its very nature, the power to regulate the
marriage relation includes the power to
determine the requisite of a valid marriage
contract and to control the qualifications of
the contracting parties, the forms and
procedures
necessary
to
solemnize
the
marriage, the duties and the obligation it
creates, its effect upon property and other
rights
and
the
grounds
for
marital
dissolution." Baehr at P. 58
The Baehr Court further stated:
"notwithstanding the state's acknowledged
stewardship over the institution of marriage,
the extent of permissible state regulation of
the
right
of
access
to
the
marital
relationship is subject to constitutional

8

limitations. It has been held that a state
may deny the right to marry only for
compelling reasons." Baehr at P. 59
In the present case the state is not denying Bunch the right
to marry, but is simply regulating the procedures necessary to
validate a marriage. This is certainly a permissible right of the
state.
Prior to the passage of the Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5,
enacted in 1987, a marriage had to be consummated by ceremony as
provided by statute since common-law marriages were not recognized
in the state of Utah.

Johnson v. Johnson, 207 P.2d 1036, 1040

(Utah 1949); In re Vetas' Estate, 170 P.2d 183, 184 (Utah 1946);
Schurler v. Industrial Commission, 43 P.2d 696, 697 (Utah 1935);
Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Utah App. 1988).
Certainly if the State Legislature can refuse to honor a
common-law marriage, it can set forth the reguirements to establish
a common-law marriage. That is what the State Legislature did with
the enactment of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5 (1953, as amended).
This statute provides a way to have a relationship validated as a
common-law marriage. It is not an unconstitutional restriction on
the access to marriage, as Bunch would have us believe, but is
another avenue the State Legislature has provided for validating a
marriage.

Bunch, in fact, never did request the judicial or

administrative validation of the relationship required by the
statute, so her arguments hold no water.

Further, the law she

cites in her support is very easily distinguishable, and does not
apply to the facts in this case.
9

POINT II
THE MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP MANDATES CERTAINTY
The Court in Vetas, Supra, sets forth the following purposes
for requiring a formal validation of a marriage:
"...is doubtless to protect the parties to the
marriage contract in the rights flowing
therefrom, and likewise to protect the
offspring. A solemn record of the contract is
made to which recourse may be had when rights
or obligations of the husband or wife arising
from the marriage are in issue. So, too, are
the interest of third parties in dealing with
either of the contracting parties, subsequent
to the marriage, thus protected."
Accordingly, to protect these interests there should be
certainty as to whether a marital relationship exists. Conversely,
when a marriage relationship is terminated, there must be certainty
as to its termination.

The Court in Johnson, Supra, stated with

regard to the certainty as to the states of marriage:
"All the elements of public policy and policy
of the law which go to favor reconciliation
during
the
interlocutory
period,
and
preservation of the marital status, are at an
end when the status of marriage has been
dissolved, and there arises a policy of the
law favoring certainty in the preservation and
maintenance
of
the
rights
which
the
declaration of termination of marital status
creates.
Any other rule would lead to
uncertainty and chaos which would plague both
the courts and society, and which would not be
justified in preserving marriages theretofore
dissolved. The obvious and ready remedy, that
of requiring the parties to remarry, is so
accessible to all who desire to perpetuate
their marital status, that we are impelled to
require this as an adequate substitute where
the parties find themselves as did these
parties, with a declaration that the marriage
has been dissolved."

10

In the present case the Appellant would have the Court impose
uncertainty upon Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5 by allowing the
statute to be deemed a statute of limitations rather than a statute
of repose.

The Supreme Court has differentiated the two:

A statute of limitations requires a lawsuit to
be filed within a specified period of time
after a legal right has been violated or the
remedy for the wrong committed is deemed
waived. Berry by and through Berry v. Beech
Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985);
A statute of repose bars all actions after a
specified period of time has run from the
occurrence of some event other than the
occurrence of an injury that gives rise to a
cause of action. Id.
To allow the statute to be interpreted as a statute of
limitations is fraught with problems.

For example, it is not

unusual for a lawsuit to last for years. Thus, the parties to the
lawsuit may have to wait years for a determination as to their
marital status.

Or what about a "latent" claim that a party

alleges years after the separation, should that party be allowed to
toll the statute, also? Without Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5 there
is no common-law marriage in Utah. Johnson, Supra. Thus, the only
right that a party has to a common-law marriage is created by the
statute itself. No statute, no right. Accordingly, declaring the
statute as a statute of repose does not divest a party of any right
he or she may otherwise have after the statutory period for the
establishing a common-law marriage, because he or she has no other
right. The statute merely tells her how to exercise what rights it
grants her.

11

Further, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5(2) is not offensive to
Article 1, Sec. 7 and Article 1, Sec. 11 of the Utah Constitution
because it gives the party relying on the statute ample opportunity
to be heard (Article 7) and ample access to the courts (Article
11).

It denies neither of these rights. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-

4.5(2) reads as follows:
The determination or establishment of a
marriage under this section must occur during
the relationship described in Subsection (1),
or within one year following the termination
of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage
recognizable under this section may be
manifested in any form, and may be proved
under the same general rules of evidence as
facts in other cases.
In establishing a common-law marriage, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 301-4.5(2) is clear as to the time frame in which the marriage must
be validated. Thus, those relying on the Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-14.5 know when the relationship will exist as a common-law marriage
and when it will not.

It is not a statute that tramples on future

or latent rights, but is a statute that demands certainty in the
establishment of a common-law marriage, and is merely a regulation
of the requisites of a valid marriage.
In the present situation, Bunch failed to ask to have the
relationship

established

to

be

a

marriage

by

a

"court

or

administrative order" within the time limits set forth in Utah Code
Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5(2).

Appellant

in no way was denied the

opportunity to be heard nor was she denied access to the courts.
For example, upon filing her complaint she could have requested the
District

Court make

a declaration
12

as to the

status

of the

relationship.

She did not even ask for such relief.

By her own

volition she did not pursue a common-law marriage as required by
statute, thus, failing this critical

step necessary

for its

validation, even though its need was pointed out to her in
Englehorn's Verified Answer, Fifth Defense, at page 4.

(R-000017)

POINT III
THE APPEALS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL.
Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that in
order to be effective, the Notice of Appeal required by Rule 3,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, must be filed with the Clerk of
the Trial Court within 30 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed

from.

Rule 3(f), Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure, requires payment of a filing fee at the time
of filing a notice of appeal. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 21-7-3 (1953, as
amended), permits an impecunious person to circumvent the fee and
bond requirements of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 6, by
filing an affidavit of impecuniosity.
In

connection

with

the

filing

of

an

affidavit

of

impecuniosity, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 21-7-3 (1953, as amended),
requires that the person seeking the benefits of the statute, swear
to an oath.
An "oath" consists of a solemn declaration, manifestation of
an intent to be bound by the statement, the signature of the
declarant and acknowledgment by an authorized person that the oath
was taken. McKniqht v. State Land Board, 381 P.2d 726, 734 (Utah,
1963). Specifically, to constitute an "oath" within the meaning of
13

statutes requiring an act to be done under oath, there must be some
outward formality, and some manifestation of intention to place the
affiant under penalty and obligation of an oath.

There must be

definite evidence that the affiant was not only conscious that he
or she was taking an oath, but there must be some outward act form
which that consciousness can be definitely inferred, which cannot
be done from the mere signature to an printed form of an oath.
Spangler v. District Court of Salt Lake County, et al, 140 P.2d
755, 758 (Utah, 1943).
In this case, Bunch did nothing more with respect to her
"affidavits" than appear before a notary public and sign the
documents.

She did not raise her hand.

She did not take an oath.

In fact, the notary public says that no oath was administered. The
purported "Affiant" made no outward manifestation which could be
construed to be an oath.
As a result, Bunch's attempt to avoid costs through the filing
of an affidavit of impecuniosity, necessarily fails. She is thrown
back on the requirement that, like the rest of the public, she must
pay a filing fee. She did not pay any filing fee, nor file a valid
affidavit of impecuniosity, before November 12, 1993, the deadline
for filing a notice of appeal.
The Clerk may not file a notice of appeal until he or she has
received the appropriate filing fee, or substitute.

In McLain v.

Conrad, 431 P.2d 571 (Utah, 1967), a notice of appeal was left at
the Clerk's office before the expiration of the time for filing,
but the filing fee was not paid until after expiration of the time
14

for filing, and the Clerk did not file the notice until the fee was
paid.

The Utah Supreme Court held that the notice was untimely

filed and the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
In this case, Bunch tried to avoid the necessity of paying a
filing fee by filing a purported "Affidavit of Impecuniosity". She
did not swear to any oath, nor was any oath administered by the
notary public.
public.

She only signed the "Affidavit" before the notary

Such signing, lacking any raising of the hand or other

outward manifestation of an intention to take an oath, and to be
bound, is insufficient to create an oath or affidavit.

Since no

filing fee was timely paid, the "filing" of the notice of appeal is
a nullity, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to do anything other
than dismiss the appeal, after first striking the notice of appeal,
it having been "filed" without the payment of the required fee.
POINT IV
THE "JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE" IS NOT AN APPEALABLE
ORDER.
Rule 54(a) of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure states in
pertinent part that a "Judgment as used in these rules includes a
decree and any order from which an appeal lies."

Rule 54(b)

explains that unless all claims are adjudicated absent a specific
finding that no just reason for delay exists and judgment should be
entered, any order or other form of decision , however called, does
not terminate the action.
In the present case, no final order or judgment was rendered
by

the

Trial

Court.

Issues

remained

certification under Rule 54(b) was made.
15

for

decision.

No

The Court only made an

interim ruling that Englehorn could seek attorney fees, but made no
final decision as to the amount of attorney fees to be awarded, or
even it they would be awarded.
In First Security Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah
1991), and A. J. MacKay Co. v. Okland Construction Company, 817
P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court held that where
issues and parties remained before the Trial Court, and where no
certification as provided for by Rule 54(b) was made, the orders
appealed

from were not final, were not appealable, and the

appropriate remedy was dismissal of the appeals.
POINT V
APPELLANT BUNCH MAY NOT RAISE ON APPEAL ISSUES NOT PRESENTED NOR
ARGUED TO THE TRIAL COURT.
Plaintiff Bunch argues that Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5,
(1) is a statute of repose rather than of limitations, which it is;
(2) that the statute cited violates the "open courts" provision,
Article I, Section II, Utah Constitution; (3) that it violates
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution pertaining to "due
process of law"; (4) that the statute should be interpreted as one
of limitation, not repose; and (5) that no attorney fees should be
awarded.

Not one of those arguments was ever presented or made to

the Trial Court, with the possible exception of the "limitation vs.
repose" argument in a very vague way.

(See R-000145 through R-

000152) .
Defenses and claims not raised in the Trial Court cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.
P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983).

Bangerter v. Poulton, 663

Where there is no indication in the
16

record on appeal that the Trial Court reached or ruled on an issue,
the Court of Appeals will not undertake to consider the issue on
appeal.

Broberq v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App., 1989).

Not having ever presented or made her current arguments to the
Trial Judge, the same cannot now be raised for the first time on
appeal.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the District Court properly
recognized that Bunch did not meet the requirements of Utah Code
Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5(2) in her effort to have a relationship deemed
a common-law marriage.

Since no filing fee was timely paid, the

filing of the "Notice of Appeal" is void.

The "Judgment of

Dismissal with Prejudice" is not a final order and is thus not to
be heard by this Court. Bunch cannot raise arguments for the first
time on appeal. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the District
Court's decision, and dismiss the appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this IZU~-

day of CL^^J^T

^ 1994.

WILLARD R. BISHOP
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) full, true and correct
copies of the above document to Stephen Julien, Esquire, at 216
South 200 West, Cedar City, UT 84720, by first-class mail, postage
prepaid, this /zffiL> day of August, 1994.
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TITLE II.
A P P E A L ? FROM JUDGMENTS AND OliDLIiS OF
TUIAL COURTS.
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final o r d e r s a n d j u d g m e n t s . An appeal may be
taken from a district, juvenile, or cncuit court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appeal flora all final ordeis and judgments, except as
otherwise provided by law, b} filing a notice of appeal with the c k r k ol the
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take
any step other t h a n the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal, but is giound only for such action as the appellate court
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) J o i n t or c o n s o l i d a t e d a p p e a l s . If two or more parties are entitled to
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may jem in an
appeal of another party after filing separate t i r cK notices of appeal. Joint
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the
separate appeals.
(c) D e s i g n a t i o n of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence cf the appeal, except where
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as the
petitioner and any other party as the respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate ihe court from which the appeal is
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a c^py
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or. if the
party is r.A represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last
known address.
(0 Filing a n d d o c k e t i n g fees in civil a p p e a l s . At the time of filing any
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees a* are established by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal m the appellate court.
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice cf appeal unless the filing
and docketing fees are paid.
(g) D o c k e t i n g of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit one copy of the notice of appea 1 , shoving the date of its filing, the docketing fee, and a copy of the bond required bv Rule G i r a certification by the
clerk that the bond has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court Upon
receipt cf the copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing tee, *he clerk of
the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the1 docket. An appeal shall be
docketed under the title given to the action m the trial court, with the appellant identified as Mich, but if the titl«» '1<)<>, not contain ihe name cf the appellant, c uch name ^hall he added to the titU
(Amended effective Octohei 1 ilY.L} »

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
By: Stephen W. Julien, #1765
P.O. Box 1538
216 South 200 West
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BARBARA LYNN BUNCH, a/k/a
BARBARA LYNN ENGLEHORN,

*
*

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

•

Plaintiff,

*

vs.

*

BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN,

Civil No. °\ \ ^\ °t Q GC S>7

*

Defendant.

*
*

COMES NOW, the plaintiff above named for cause of action
against

the above-named

defendant,

complains

and alleges

as

follows:
1.

That plaintiff is now and for more than three months

last past has been a bona fide resident of Iron County, State of
Utah.
2.

That the parties are validly married to each other under

Section 30-1-4.5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended though they
never solemnized the marriage.

The parties began living together

in March 1979 in Brian Head, Iron County, Utah, and continued to
live together by agreement until August 18, 1990. During that
period of time, the parties have mutually assumed marital rights,
duties and obligations, and have held themselves out as husband and
wife.

Both

parties

are capable

of consenting

to a marital

Barbara Bunch,a/k/a,Engeihorn v. Brian Lynn Engelhorn
Verified Complaint
relationship and legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage
under Utah Lav/.
3. That there are no children born as issue of this marriage,
and none are expected.
4. That there have been irreconcilable differences making it
impossible to continue the marriage relationship.
5. That during the marriage the parties have acquired certain
personal property, and that it is just and equitable that it be
divided as follows:
To the plaintiff:
1.

1980 Subaru authomobile

2.

King-size bed

3.

25" color television

4.

Refrigerator

5.

Washer

6.

Dryer

7.

Freezer

8.

308 Remington rifle

9.

14-foot sailboat

10.

Two kayaks

11.

Skis

12.

Microwave oven and stan

13.

Dinette set
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14.

Ceramic art work, including large
rust colored plate & 1 set of cups

15.

Mug collecion

16.

Hope chest

17.

Sewing machine

18.

Blender

19.

Linens and towels

20.

Pots and pans

21.

Wicker chair

22.

Dinnerware

23.

Utensils

24.

Large trampoline

25.

Small trampoline

26.

Mountain bike

27.

Ten-speed road bike

28.

Raft with equipment

29.

Four photo albums

30.

Scrap books

31.

Lawn mower

32.

Weedeater

33.

Painting of Parowan Valley in rain storm

34.

One red standstone photo

35.

Two oak picture frames

36.

Ironing board
3
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37.

Iron

38.

Quilted wall hanging given by her mother

39.

Utility trailer

40.

Two-drawer oak filing cabinet

41.

Dishwasher

42.

Two crock pots

43.

One nightstand

44.

Spice rack

45.

Barbecue utensils

46.

Water filter

47.

Large folding table

48.

Ironwood carving

49.

Large picture of arch in oak frame

50.

Two lamps

51.

Toaster

52.

One-half of the potted plants

53.

One couch, jungle print

54.

One set of speakers

55.

Hoses and sprinklers

56.

One vacuum cleaner

57.

Chest of drawers

58.

Sears stereo

59.

Her personal effects and belongings.

4
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B.

6*

To the defendant:
1.

1959 Willeys automobile

2.

1968 Chevrolet pickup

3.

1981 Tyota Corolla automobile

4.

One vacuum cleaner

5.

Kenwood stereo

6.

One red standstone photo

7.

19° color television

8.

Queen-size bed

9.

One black couch

10.

Telescope

11.

Coffee maker

12.

One-half of the potted plants

13.

One lamp

14.

One night stand

15.

Chest of drawers

16.

His personal effects and belongings.

That the parties have acquired a home located at 47

Pioneer Way, Parowan, Iron County, Utah, legally described as:
Commencing at a point 12 feet South
and 9 rods 3 1/2 feet West of the
Northeast Corner of Lot 19. Block 13
Plat A, Parowan City survey, and
running thence South 7 rods 4 1/2 feet
thence West 85 feet, thence North 7
rods 4 1/2 feet thence East 85 feet to
the point of beginning.
TOGETHER WITH all rights, privileges,
5
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easements, rights-of way, improvments,
and appurtenances thereunto belonging
or in anyway appertaining.
TOGETHER WITH 1 hour of Water from the
Parowan City Irrigation Water Company.
and that it is just and equitable that said home be awarded to
plaintiff subject to all debts and encumbrances thereof.
7.

That the parties have acquired five acres at the Castle

Valley River Ranches, Utah, and that it is just and equtiable that
said property be awarded to defendant subject to all debts and
encumbrances thereon.
8.

That each of the parties should be responsible for their

own debts in their own names since their separation on August 18,
1990, and that it is just and equitable that plaintiff pay the debt
owed to FMHA for the loan on the home and that defendant pay all
other debts of the marriage incurred by the parties while they were
together, and

that defendant

should

hold plaintiff

harmless

thereof, including:
A.
9.

Property taxes owned on the home of the parties.

That plaintiff should be awarded a reasonable amount as

alimony.
10. That each of the parties should be awarded one-half of all

11.

That plaintiff should have her former name of BUNCH

restored to her.

6
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12.

That it is just and proper that defendant should be

restrained

from

vexing,

harassing,

annoying,

bothering,

threatening, or abusing plaintiff.
13.

That each party should be responsible for their own

attorney fees in this matter.
14.

That defendant should be required to pay all court costs.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment against the defendant
as follows:
1.

That the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore existing

between the aprties be dissolved and held for naught on the grounds
of irreconcilable differences.
2.

That the personal property acquired during the marriage

be divided as set forth above.
3.

That the parties have acquired a home located at 47

Pioneer Way, Parowan, Iron County, Utah, legally described as:
Commencing at a poing 1/2 feet South
and 9 rods 3 1/2 feet West of the
Northweast Corner of Lot 19. Block 13
Plat A, Parowan City survey, and
running thence South 7 rods 4 1/2 feet
thence West 85 feet, thence North 7
rods 4 1/2 feet thence East 85 feet to
the point of beginning.
TOGETHER WITH all rights, privileges,
easements, rights-of-way, improvements,
and appurtenances thereunto belonging
or in anyway appertaining.
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TOGETHER WITH 1 hour of Water from the
Parowan City Irrigation Water Company.
and that said home be awarded to plaintiff subject to all debts and
encumbrances thereon.
4.

That each of the parties be responsible for their own

debts in their own names since their separation on August 18, 1990,
and that it is just and equitable that plaintiff pay the debt owed
to FMHA for the loan on the home and that defendant pay all other
debts of the marriage incurred by the parties while they were
together, and

that

defendant

should

hold

plaintiff

harmless

thereof, including the debts listed above.
5. That plaintiff be awarded a reasonable amount as alimony.
6.

That plaintiff should have her former name of BUNCH

restored to her.
7.

That defendant be restrined

from vexing, harassing,

annoying, bothering, threatening, or abusing plaintiff.
8. That each party be responsible for their own attorney fees
in this matter.

DATED this

UTAH LfiGAL SERVICES, itfS^.
Attorneys for M a i n t i f f
By: S t e p h e n / W / J u l i e n
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Plaintiff's address:
P. 0. Box 484
Parowan, Utah

84761

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF IRON

)

Barbara Lynn Bunch,a/k/a, Barbara Lynn Englehorn, being first
duly sworn, deposes and says:

That she read the foregoing

complaint, knows the contents thereof, and that the same are true
except as to matters which are baed upon information and belief and
as to those matters she believes them to be true.

ti^^f

„

3ARBARA t*YNN "B#NCH, a/k/a
BARBARA LYNN ENGLEHORN
In the County of
ft-(7L

day of SJ/l\'dA-J&J(*

J^i»6A.I

* State of Utah, on this

, 1991, before me, the undersigned

notary, personally appeared /?*h/?**<*
who is personally known to me or:

/Ol/t/a/C

"who proved to me her identity

through documentary evidence in the form of a (JJ^K-lx

Z^J>L

to be the person who signed the preceding document in my presence
and who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is voluntary
and the document truthful.

My Commission Expires:
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Defendant
P. 0- Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801) 586-9483

o ^ -v - -w.

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BARBARA LYNN BUNCH,
Plaintiff,

VERIFIED ANSWER

vs.
Civil No. °1 1M100OS 7

BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN,
Defendant.
COMES

NOW

DEFENDANT,

who

answers

Plaintiff's

Verified

Complaint as follows:
ANSWER
FIRST DEFENSE
(Failure to State Claim)
1.

The Verified Complaint fails to state a claim against

Defendant upon which relief may be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
(Pleading to the Merits)
2.

Paragraph 1 of the Verified Complaint is denied for lack

of personal knowledge on the part of Defendant, upon to base a
reasoned response.

Please is put to her burden of proof.

3. Answering paragraph 2 of the Verified Complaint, Defendant
admits that for a certain period of time Plaintiff lived with

on

Defendant.

Defendant admits, upon information and belief, that

borh parties were capable of consenting to a maritol relationship
and were legally capable of entering into a solemnized marriage
under Utah law.

Defendant denies all other allegations contained

in paragraph 2 of the Verified Complaint.
4.

Answering paragraph 3, Defendant admits that no children

have been born to Plaintiff and Defendant, and that no children are
expected.

Defendant

denies

the

existence

of

any

marriage

relationship.
5.

Paragraph 4 of the Verified Complaint is denied.

6. Answering paragraph 5, Defendant denies that there was any
marriage and therefore, denies that any
place.

"division" should take

There is no basis for any such division.

All allegations

of paragraph 5 not specifically treated herein, are hereby denied.
Defendant asserts that each party is entitled only to those items
of personal property belonging to him or her in their individual
capacities.
7.

Paragraph 6 of the Verified Complaint is denied.

The home

located at 47 Pioneer Way, Parowan, Iron County, Utah, is the
property of Defendant.
8. Answering paragraph 7, Defendant asserts that any property
owned by the parties is not subject to division by this Court.
9. Answering paragraph 8 of the Verified Complaint, Defendant
admits liability for his debts in his own name, since he incurred
them.

Likewise, Defendant admits that Plaintiff is obligated for

her own debts.

There is no basis for any division or allocation of
2
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debts by the Court, since there never has been any marriage between
the parties.

Defendant admits liability for property taxes, since

the home is his.

All allegations of paragraph 8 not specifically

treated herein are hereby denied.
10.

Paragraph 9 of the Verified Complaint is denied.

Since

there never was any marriage between the parties, there exists no
entitlement to alimony.
existed, which

Further, even if such an entitlement

is denied, Plaintiff

is still not

entitled

to

alimony, being able to support herself.
11.

Paragraph 10 of the Verified Complaint is denied.

No

basis exists to divide or allocate property between the parties
since they never were married.
12.

Answering

paragraph

11, Defendant

Plaintiffs name is, in fact, "Bunch".

denies

the same.

There has never been any

marriage, nor has Plaintiff ever been named "Engelhorn".
13.

Paragraph

12

of

the Verified

Complaint

is

denied.

Further, it is redundant.
14.

Answering paragraph 13, Defendant admits that Plaintiff

should be responsible for her own attorney fees in this matter.
Defendant asserts, however, that Plaintiff should pay his attorney
fees.
15.

Paragraph 14 of the Verified Complaint is denied.
THIRD DEFENSE
(Statute Prospective Only)

16.

UCA 30-1-4.5 (1953, as amended), was effective beginning

in early 1987, and was prospective in nature only.

It cannot be

3
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applied to the alleged and nonexistent "marriage" between Plaintiff
and Defendant.

See Layton v. Layton, 777 P.2d 504 (Utah Ct. App.

1989) .
FOURTH DEFENSE
(Statute for Welfare Purposes Only)
17.

Upon information and belief, Defendant asserts that UCA

30-1-4.5 (1953, as amended), was intended to be applied to the socalled "common law marriage" only when the State of Utah desired to
recover welfare benefits of some sort. As a result, the statute is
not applicable to the "relationship" v/hich previously existed
between these parties.
FIFTH DEFENSE
(Action Not Timely)
18. Even if UCA 30-1-4.5 (1953, as amended), were applicable,
which Defendant denies, Plaintiff's action v/ould be barred by the
provisions of UCA 30-1-4.5(2) (1953, as amended), for the reason
that more than one year has passed since the termination of such
alleged "relationship".
SIXTH DEFENSE
(Additional Defenses Not Waived)
19. Defendant may have additional defenses, not now known to
him, but which may be discovered during the course of these
proceedings.

Defendant does not waive such defenses, and hereby

specifically asserts them, and reserves the right to amend to set
them out in detail as the same are discovered.
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SEVENTH DEFENSE
(Bad Faith)
20.

Plaintiff's action has been and is without merit, and has

been filed in bad faith.

Defendant is entitled to an award of his

attorney fees pursuant to the provisions of UCA 78-27-56 (1953, as
amended).
WHEREFORE,

having

fully

answered

Plaintiff's

Verified

Complaint, Defendant prays that the same be dismissed without more,
that he

be awarded his costs and

attorney fees pursuant to UCA

78-27-56

(1953, as amended), that Plaintiff take nothing by her

Verified Complaint, and that Defendant be awarded such other and
further

relief

circumstances

as

the

Court

deems

appropriate

of this case, including costs, attorney

under

the

fees, and

interest.
DATED this >? ^

day of July, 1991.

BRIAN LYNN

State of Utah

)
: ss.
County of Iron )
COMES NOW BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN, Defendant named above, who
being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states that he is the
Defendant named above, that he has read and is familiar with the

015

.matters set forth in the within and foregoing Verified Answer and
Counterclaim, and that the same are true, according to his own best
knowledge, information, and belief.
DATED this

5?5" day of July, 1991.

BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this t_

day of July,

1991.
*

BARBARA W R I G H T ' " ^

/
C c l r G ' L:^ O4720
{.
j My Co'rmiss'on Expires Sept 2,1992 K

$y*'c6iiMZsstvfa^&%p±'t&s:i-

NOTARY P U B L I C

J

Residing in:

-?

/

APPROVED FOR FILING:

WILLARD R. BISHC
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing document to Mr. Stephen W. Julien,
Esq., Attorney at Law, of Utah Legal Services, Inc., at P. 0. Box
1538, Cedar City, Utch 84721-1538, by first-class mail, postage
fully prepaid this

'Z.tetf? day of July, 1991.

Q
Secretary

t

,
, I
U
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IRON, STATE OF UTAH
J. PHILIP EVES, Judge

BARBARA LYNN BUNCH,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 914900057

vs.
BRIAN LYNN ENGLEHORN,
Defendant.

REPORTER'S HEARING TRANSCRIPT
Wednesday, June 2, 1993
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:
For the Plaintiff:

THE PARK FIRM
BY: FLOYD W HOLM, ESQ.
965 South Main, #3

Cedar City, Utah 84720
For the Defendant:

WILLARD R. BISHOP, ESQ.
36 North 300 West

Cedar City, Utah 84770

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

p.o noxir.v*
ST OEORCE, UTAH 84770
(80DG73-5315
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1

PAROWAN, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, JUNE 2, 1993

2

-oOo-

3
4

THE COURT:

5

That brings us to 91-0057, Bunch

versus Englehorn.

6

MR. HOLM:

7

THE COURT:

8

We're ready to proceed, Your Honor.
In this case, there is also a motion

for a continuance.

9

I

Is that now moot?

10

J

MR. BISHOP:

It is —

well, not moot.

The

11

Court's ruled on it, and there is —

12

table in front of the Court an order reflecting the Court's

13

ruling.

It's been approved by counsel.

14
15

THE COURT:

Well, your order contains a denial

cf the motion to amend the Complaint.

16

Was that also

17

MR. BISHOP:

18

THE COURT:

19

there should be on the

—
That was done too.

Was that also done during our phone

conference?

20

MR. BISHOP:

21

THE COURT:

Yes.
Hold on just a second.

There is in

22

the file a Minute Entry which reflects my recollection of

23

what happened during that phone conference.

24

I'm wrong.

25

The matter came before me on —

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

Correct me if

during a
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1

telephonic conference en the motion to continue of

2

Mr. Holm, representing that he needed to continue the

3

matter because he wanted to prepare and file an Amended

4

Complaint.

5

unsigned attached to his motion, but there is no motion to

6

amend the Complaint in the file, and I don't recall one

7

ever being made.

There is a copy of an Amended Complaint

8

MR. BISHOP:

9

THE COURT:

I have a copy, and one was made.
I don't see it in the file.

10

Do you have a copy?

11

MR. BISHOP:

12

MR. HOLM:

13
14

I

Let me —

I do.

MR. BISHOP:

Yeah.

THE COURT:

You do?

I'm sure you do.

And I do

too.

15

|

16

I it didn't reach the file.

I'd like to see it, because

17

MR. BISHOP:

18

THE COURT: Where's the copy of the Amended

19

Complaint?

20

motion for continuance?

21

There it is. Yeah.

Was that the same one that you attached to your

MR. HOLM:

Well, it should have been attached to

22

the motion for leave to amend, but that's the original

23

Amended Complaint, Your Honor.

24
25

THE COURT:

Okay.

And this one is also

unsigned.
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In any case, this motion and this discussion
occurred —

when? —

last Friday, was it?

MR. BISHOP:
MR. HOLM:

Thursday, I believe.

Thursday, I believe, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thursday.
MR. HOLM:

I wasn't present, of course.

Mr. Park handled that.
THE COURT:

On 5-26.

Which would have been last

Wednesday was when we had our conference.
And at that time, as I recall, I indicated that
I was not inclined to grant a continuance for the —

so

that Mr. Holm could amend pleadings, in view of the fact
that the trial v/as set for today, and I considered that too
late.

And if that's what your order says, I'll gladly

execute it.

It has been approved by Mr. Park

MR. BISHOP:
THE COURT:

—

It has.
—

which makes me wonder is Mr. Park

representing the plaintiff in this matter?
MR. HOLM:

No.

He asked —

he just stood in in

my stead on that motion.
THE COURT:

Do you want to review this and sign

it as well?
MR. HOLM:

I can certainly sign off on it.

MR. BISHOP:
MR. HOLM:

He has seen it.
If he has signed off on it, I can
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1 certainly do the same.
To quote Mr. Park this morning, he

MR. BISHOP:

1 very succinctly stated that'rs what happened.
THE COURT:

All right.

the right attorney on there

I think we ought to get

Thank you.

Would you do the copy, too, so we

MR. BISHOP:

can get a conformed copy?
MR. HOLM:

Sure.

THE COURT:

All right.

Both sides having

approved the order, I'11 execute it.
MR. BISHOP:

We'd like the Court to sign the

copy, too,r so we have a conformed copy.
THE COURT:

All right.

It's been executed.

Thank you •
MR. BISHOP:

Thank you »
Let me return your original and then

THE COURT:

the Complaint, Mr. Holm, so the record is clear.

And there

is a copy of that Complaint attached to your motion to
amend.
MR. HOLM:

Thank you.
All :right.

THE COURT:

Are both sides ready to

try the matter , then?
MR. BISHOP:
MR. HOLM:
THE COURT:

Yes , sir.
Yes.
Okay .

Mr. Holm, do you wish to make

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
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an opening statement?
MR. HOLM:

Briefly, Your Honor.

This is a case

where I guess you would call it a common-law divorce.
Obviously by that very statement, I've indicated what the
key issue we believe in the case to be, and that is whether
there was a common-law marriage.
The parties were —

set up shop together, I

guess you could say, in 1982, I believe it was.
MS. BUNCH:

'79.

MR. HOLM:

1979.

corrected me on that.

I'm sorry.

My client has

And were together until 1990.

Some

11 years.
The evidence is going to show that during that
period of time, they behaved as if they were husband and
wife.

Family and friends, of course, knew that they

weren't formally involved in a solemnized marriage, but
they behaved as if they were husband and wife.
We are going to have evidence to the effect that
they purchased property together; that they, of course,
shared expenses; that they lived together, of course, and
that they behaved as if they were husband and wife.
Specifically, two .of Mrs. Bunch's siblings —
Miss Bunch's — Miss Bunch's siblings are going to testify
that on one occasion, when Miss Bunch graduated from
Southern Utah University, that at that time, they were
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together in the home, and Mr. Englehorn at that time stated
that the parties were married as common-law husband and
wife.
That also at that time, Mr. Englehorn signed a
deed to the property that the parties purchased here in
Parowan in favor of both of them jointly, and that they
were witnesses to that deed, and that that deed —

we have

the original here for the Court, of course, that
establishes again that they were purchasing property
together and again behaving as if they were husband and
wife.
There's also going to be some bank records that
we're going to show — use to show that Miss Bunch
contributed toward the purchase of that home.

Contributed

toward mortgage payments; contributed to the down payment.
Paid some $2,000 toward the down payment of that home. All
to establish that there was a common-law marriage.
There, of course, will also be testimony
regarding various items of personal property that the
parties purchased together.

And, of course, the Court is

going to need to divide that equitably.
Other than the debt on the home, there's not
going to be any debt that the Court is going to have to
divide and apportion between the parties.

That appears to

be the only debt is the debt related to the home.
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There will be some testimony regarding some
difficulties that the parties have had —

some harassment

and so on on the part of Mr. Englehorn —

which we believe

would entitle Miss Bunch to a restraining order

—

permanent injunction against him from vexing or harassing
her.

And based upon that evidence, Your Honor, we believe

that the Court can make a determination to equitably divide
the property of the parties and get these parties divorced
as if they were married in a solemnized marriage.
Thank you.
THE COURT:

Do you wish to make an opening

statement now, Mr. Bishop?
MR. BISHOP:

Yes, Your Honor, I do.

The defense, of course, disagrees with that
opening statement, as you may have been able to glean from
the pleadings in this case.
Before getting into the situation as to what we
believe the facts will show, we'd like to call the Court's
attention to Utah Code Annotated 30-1-4.5.

I've provided

the Court with a copy, along with a copy of cases which
annotate that since its passage in 1957.
There are some elements that we think the Court
is going to have to watch for as we go into the evidence.
The first is whether or not there was ever a contract of
marriage.

We think the evidence will show that there was
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not.

We don't think the evidence will show that there

were —

was any consent to any marriage by the parties.

We'll admit that the parties were capable of giving
consent.

They're both competent individuals.

We'll admit

that they were legally capable of entering a solemnized
marriage.

We will admit that they have cohabited.

However, we believe the evidence will show that the
cohabitation that occurred in this situation was not the
sort that occurs in a marriage.

That it was a very much on

and off again thing, and that basically it occurred during
the wintertime and the early spring when Miss Bunch was
working in Brian Head, and that when her employment
terminated at Brian Head —

when the ski season ended, that

she would disappear into California where she carried on
her own thing and her own relationships apart from
Mr. Englehorn.
The evidence will also show that during the
period of time that she asserts she was married, that she
had relationships with other men in this area also, all of
which go to establish that there was no intent of the
parties to act as husband and wife.
We don't believe the evidence will show that
there was any mutual assumption of marital rights, duties
and obligations.

Specifically Mr. Englehorn denies the

assertion made by counsel that at any time he held him or
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Miss Bunch out as being married to anyone.
Further, the evidence will show that at no time
have the parties acquired a general and uniform reputation
as husband and wife. We think that the evidence will show
that whatever the relationship was —
wasn't that of husband and wife —

and it certainly

it commenced in '78 or

'79 and continued on an on and off again basis until about
the 17th of August of 1990, when there was a blowup between
the parties.
We believe the evidence v/ill show that everyone
who knew the parties knew that they were not husband and
wife.

They were never reputed to be husband and wife; they

didn't act as husband and wife.
Contrary to the opening statement of counsel, we
believe the evidence v/ill shov/ that the parties did not buy
real property together.
that are involved.

There are two pieces of property

One of them is a lot in I think it's

called Castle Valley Ranches over in Grand County that was
purchased in 1981 by Mr. Englehorn.

And all the documents

related to that show that he purchased it as a single man.
There was a home that he purchased in 1982 here
in Parowan.

The evidence will show, contrary to counsel's

statement, that at that time, in order to obtain the $5,000
down payment that he needed, he borrowed money from
Mr. Michael Gclden to the tune of $500 and some money from
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his father.

He did, in fact, borrow $500 from Miss Bunch

to allow him to complete the amount he needed for the down
payment, but that was a loan that was paid back to her.
The evidence will show that throughout the period of the
relationship, he was the one that paid for these pieces of
property.

They're his.
And there's a deed that counsel talked about.

It's a warranty deed that appears to be dated the 3 0th of
May of 1986.
document.

Now, there's some real questions about that

Mr. Englehorn denies ever having signed that

document or ever having delivered it to Miss Bunch.

The

evidence will show that when you look at that document on
its face, it raises questions.

There is a signature that

purports to be the signature of Mr. Englehorn, but it's not
placed normally as it would be placed on a deed if you or I
were going to sign it. The evidence will show that that
deed is not his signature.
We have an expert who will appear and testify
Mr. George Throckmorton —

—

who's analyzed the document and

will say that it's not Mr. Englehorn's signature.
All in all, v/e don't believe that the plaintiff
will be able to meet her burden with respect to
establishing the existence of a —

I don't suppose that we

really should call it a common-law marriage, because it's
not.

It's not a creature of the common law, it's a
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creature of statute here in the state of Utah.

But we

don't believe she'll be able to establish those elements.
We'll ask the Court to look at the time periods
involved, because at the close of Plaintiff's case, I'll
have a motion to make with respect to that.
And that would leave the only other issue as to
whether or not she has an interest in the home in Parowan
by reason of that deed.

And we think that the evidence

will show that no, she does not, because that deed was not
ever signed by Mr. Englehorn.
Thank you.
THE COURT:

All right.

I note in your opening

statements that neither of you has addressed Paragraph (2)
of 30-1-4.5.
MR. BISHOP:
Honor.

That's the time function, Your

And that's the motion I referred to at the end,

that I will make at the end of Plaintiff's case.
THE COURT:

Well, I'm interested in knowing what

the plaintiff's position is on that before we start taking
evidence.
MR. HOLM:

I believe we're saying that the

separation occurred, as I read the Complaint
THE COURT:
MR. HOLM:

—

In August of 1990?
—

in August of 1990.

And the

Complaint was filed within a year of that time.
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MR. BISHOP:

Why don't I make that —

THE COURT:

This doesn't refer to the filing of

a Complaint, it refers to a determination or establishment
of the marriage, which must occur within one year after the
breakup.

It does not appear to me that you can meet your

threshold burden.
MR. BISHOP:

Let me make that motion now, Your

Honor.
Based on counsel's opening statement, we move to
dismiss any claims based upon a common-law marriage based
upon Subsection (2) of the statute —
MR. HOLM:

I may have misread that.

MR. BISHOP:

—

for the reason that by her own

admission and statement, the relationship —
were such a relationship —

even if there

which we don't admit

—

terminated in the middle of August of 1990. And as of this
date in 1993, there has never been any establishment by an
administrative agency or by the Court that such a
relationship constituted a statutory marriage.
THE COURT:
MR. HOLM:
I —

Mr. Holm?
Well, I —

I guess I'm confused.

I thought filing a Complaint was to —
MR. BISHOP: No.
MR. HOLM:

—

to accomplish that very purpose to

have that determination made.

And because the trial has
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now occurred much more than a year since the relationship
terminated, I can't see how that would —

that should

prejudice Miss Bunch simply because the trial has now
occurred more than a year after.
THE COURT:

I don't see any authority there that

says that the time is tolled from —

from the point when

you file a Complaint.
MR. HOLM:

Well —

THE COURT:

It says clearly that the

determination or establishment of the marriage must occur
within the relationship or within one year following the
termination of the relationship.

And admittedly by the

facts, it hasn't occur, has it?
MR. HOLM:

Well —

if that's the way you're

going to interpret the statute, then I'm going to have to
admit that, yes. But I —

I guess I would have some

concerns about the constitutionality of such a statute when
it would make it —

when a person files a Complaint to have

that determination made, and simply because of the delays
and court time and that sort of thing, it can't get it to
court.
THE COURT: Well, have you ever tried to get it
to court?
MR. BISHOP: No.
THE COURT:

Have you ever made a motion to
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establish the marriage in this case?
MR. HOLM:

I have not.

I'm only in the case for

a month.
THE COURT:
either.

I understand.

And nobody else has

And I don't think that's a constitutional

question, because I think you're entitled to bring a motion
right at the outset of the case to have the Court examine
this very issue and determine whether or not there's a
valid marriage and establish that before we proceed with
the issue of whether you can get a divorce.
MR. HOLM:

Well, if that's the interpretation of

the statute, then I've got to —
have anything to contest that.

to concede that I don't
I —

but I guess I've

misconstrued it or —
THE COURT:

It's something that I can't find any

cases on.
Have either of you seen any previous —
MR. HOLM:

I'm not aware of any case law.

THE COURT:
MR. BISHOP:

—

cases construing that?

There is not on this particular

case in the state of Utah.

However, there is case law

which did argue the same point.
documents I've given you.

And it's in those

Basically what the Court of

Appeals has said is that if —
THE COURT:

Which case are we talking about?
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MR. BISHOP:

I can't point a finger at it right

now, but it's in that —
you.

in those four cases that I gave

It operated under a different fact situation.

We had

two or three situations in those cases where the trial
courts wanted very much to establish a common-law
marriage.

And they tried to do so where it had commenced

before the effective date of the statute.

And in each and

every case, the Court of Appeals has said, "No.
do that."

You can't

Prior to that time, and even in one of them, it

said there's a lack of subject matter jurisdiction to do
that, because until the effective date of the statute, the
Court, under the prior statutes that were in effect in the
state of Utah, had no subject matter jurisdiction to
declare a common-law marriage.
THE COURT:

Yes.

I've read those cases.

Well, I guess the first question is whether we
have the facts sufficiently straight that we are able to
rule on the motion Mr. Bishop has just raised.
MR. HOLM:

And I —

of course it gets —

that's

the very reason I filed the motion to amend the Complaint
is because of that concern.
appropriate —

I mean I —

And maybe it's more

I've got some concerns about

res judicata, but I would rather proceed on the Amended
Complaint —

much rather —

THE COURT:

because of those concerns.

You were hired a month ago; is that
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correct?
MR. HOLM: Yes.
THE COURT: And you acted very expeditiously to
get an Amended Complaint in the file, even though the case
has been pending for a couple years?
MR. HOLM: Yes.
THE COURT:

However, I've ruled on your motion

to amend the Complaint, and I think properly so.

And even

if I grant Mr. Bishop's motion, I think you can still raise
those issues in a new lawsuit.
MR. HOLM:

Okay.

THE COURT: And I don't think these issues have
been precluded by any rule I make today.
MR. HOLM:

That's my concern.

I don't want to

have a res judicata effect of —
THE COURT: Well, they'd be totally different
claims.

The only thing in the Complaint before me now is a

claim for divorce; isn't that correct?
MR. HOLM: Yes.
MR. BISHOP:

That's right.

THE COURT: And if I rule there's no marriage,
then the only thing that's res judicata is that ruling.
Give me just a moment here.
Well, does either side wish to research the
issue further, or did you want to just submit it for
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decision?
MR. BISHOP:
MR. HOLM:

We'll submit it for decision.

Well, I'm afraid that I'm not going

to find anything in Utah law —
MR. BISHOP:
MR. HOLM:

That's true.

—

He won't.

on the issue, Your Honor.

So I

think it's one of first impression, basically.
THE COURT:

Well, part of the problem is we're

dealing with a statute which is of relatively recent
origin.

It was passed in '87, as I understand the law, and

really hasn't been interpreted much in the state.

It's a

really tough statute to apply, and it requires a —

quite a

forceful showing even to meet all the elements which
Mr. Bishop has pointed out.
But Paragraph (2) seems to govern this case
right at the outset.

And it requires that there has to be

some determination or establishment of a marriage during
that marriage —

or whatever that relationship is —

within

one year following the termination of the relationship.
And as I understand the facts in this case, the parties
separated in August of 1990, and so any relationship that
would have been in existence terminated on that date, and
we are now almost two years downstream from that.
MR. BISHOP:
THE COURT:

Three years, almost.
Three years downstream from that.
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So clearly there was no determination or establishment of
the marriage under this section within one year from the
termination of the relationship.

And based upon that, I

find that 30-1-4.5 does not apply, and that there was no
valid marriage established under the meaning —

within the

meaning of that statute.
MR. BISHOP:

Given that, Your Honor, we ask that

the Complaint be dismissed.
THE COURT: Mr. Holm, did you have anything
else?
MR. HOLM:

No.

THE COURT:

Submit it.

The only thing in the Complaint is a

claim for divorce, as I understand.

And the Court having

ruled that there was no valid marriage, the Complaint is
inappropriate, and there are no grounds for that Complaint,
and it's ordered dismissed.
MR. BISHOP:

With prejudice, as I understand?

THE COURT: Well, I think this is a —

a ruling

on the question of whether or not there's been a —
MR. BISHOP: Sure.
THE COURT:

—

a termination of a marriage under

that statute.
MR. BISHOP: Right.
THE COURT:

Insofar as that ruling is concerned,

it is with prejudice.
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MR- BISHOP:
MR. HOLM:
Honor?

Yes, sir.

I understand that.

Could we have specific findings, Your

Maybe we can test it —
THE COURT:
MR. HOLM:

You certainly may.
—

THE COURT:

with this case.

And I'm going to ask Mr. Bishop to

prepare those —
MR. BISHOP:
THE COURT:

—

MR. BISHOP:
THE COURT:
simple.

I will.
and submit them for my signature.

Fine.
The findings would be relatively

That the parties agree that the breakup of this

relationship occurred in August of 1990, and there's been
no determination within the meaning of the statute, and
that's the only thing I've ruled on.
MR. BISHOP:
thing.

I will —

Yeah.

One other —

one other

the motion is based upon counsel's

opening statement not upon any testimony that came from the
witness stand.

And I'll include that.

I will also include that counsel's opening
statement indicated that the marriage —

or the so-called

relationship, whatever it was, began in 1989.
Is that appropriate?
MR. HOLM:

If you'll stipulate to that.

I think

that's --
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MR. BISHOP:

Well, our testimony might show it

began a little earlier, if we got to that.
has —

But I think it

if we are going to talk about an appeal, I think

that it has a bearing on it. Because as I read the case
law, even if you get to the situation where a determination
is to be made within one year, the breakup of the
relationship, as I read the case law —

if the relationship

started before the effective date of the statute, still you
can't do anything.
THE COURT:

Let me just say that my ruling is

based on more than counsel's opening statement, it's based
on the Verified Complaint which contains the recital of
these very facts. Paragraph 2 of the Verified Complaint
alleges that the parties broke up on August 18th, 1990.
And so that's the —

that's the basis of my

ruling is the plaintiff's pleadings indicate that more than
a year has passed with no determination since the
termination of the relationship.

And you can include that

in your order as well.
MR. BISHOP:

Thank you.

At this point,

plaintiff having prevailed on the Complaint, as I read it,
it may be appropriate to submit the question of attorney
fees for the defendant under 78-27-56.
Would the Court prefer to do that now or at
another time?
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THE COURT:

Well, it would seem to me that you

can probably do that in writing.
Were you prepared to do that today as to time
and so forth?
MR. BISHOP:
THE COURT:

We'll do that in writing.
You're moving under the —

on the

grounds that this was a frivolous Complaint?
MR. BISHOP: Yes.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. BISHOP:
THE COURT:

Why don't you

—

I'll do that in writing.
—

file that in motion form so

Mr. Holm has time to respond to that.
MR. BISHOP:

Okay.

I'll give Mr. Holm an

opportunity to respond to it.
THE COURT: All right.

Is there anything else

we need to deal with today?
MR. BISHOP:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
Thank you all for coming.

We're in

recess.
(Whereupon the proceedings in the above-entitled
matter were concluded at 9:28 A.M.)
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C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE OF UTAH
) ss,
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON )

I, PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR, an Official Court
Reporter in and for the Fifth Judicial District, State of
Utah, do hereby certify:
That the foregoing matter, to wit, BARBARA LYNN
BUNCH VS. BRIAN LYNN ENGLEHORN, CIVIL NO. 914900057, was
taken down by me in shorthand at the time and place therein
named and thereafter reduced to computerized transcription
under my direction.
I further testify that I am not interested in
the event of the action.
WITNESS my hand and seal this 6th day of
December, 1993.

PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BARBARA LYNN BUNCH,
AFFIDAVIT OF TERESA SUNDERLAND
Plaintiff,
vs.

BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN,

Civil No. 91400057

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH )
:ss.
County of Summit )
COMES NOW TERESA SUNDERLAND, who being first duly sworn upon oath,
deposes and states as follows:
1.

Affiant is a notary public of the State of Utah.

2.

On or about November 8, 1993, an individual identified through

documentation to be Barbara L. Bunch, appeared before Affiant.

juifiao

3.

At that time, Barbara L. Bunch signed a document entitled "Affidavit of

Impecuniosity" and another entitled "Affidavit Support Impecuniosity Request". Copies of
both documents are attached, and are incorporated by this reference.
4.

The documents, on their face, appear to have been signed on November 5,

1993. In fact, they were signed on November 8, 1993, before Affiant. Affiant made certain
that she, herself, put the actual date of the appearance and signing on the documents when
Affiant notarized them.
5.

Although Ms. Bunch signed the documents before Affiant, Ms. Bunch did not

raise her hand, and did not swear an oath. Affiant did not administer an oath to Ms.
Bunch.
6.

Affiant does not personally know Barbara Lynn Bunch, and identified her only

by her Utah driver's license, No. 14616368.
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAITH NOT.
DATED this ~ 7 *

day of January, 1994
TERESA_SI#«*ERtA

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

NOTARY PUBLIC
JUDITH A. PUTMAN
1514 Park Avenue, P.O Box 1660
Park City, UT 84060
COMMISSION EXPIRES
OCT ffi, 1997
STATE Of UTAH

/

day of January, 1994.

mTARY PUBLIC
My commission expires:, JO

Residing in: ^yy^cnuJ-

-J?-?7

O^stt^

w

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and
foregoing document to Mr. Stephen W. Julien, Esq., of Utah Legal Sendees, Inc., Attorney
at Lav/, at P.O. Box 1538, Cedar City, Utah 84721-1538, by first-class mail, postage fully
prepaid this

day of January, 1994.

lAlMMiiMmL

ioO
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FILED
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT

'93NQU1Q Pn 12 38
IRON COUNTY

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
By: Stephen W. Julien, Bar No, 1765
216 South 200 West
P.O. Box 1538
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-2571
Attorneys for Plaintiff

BY

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AMD FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BARBARA LYNN BUNCH,
PIainti ff/Appel1 ant,

AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY
*
*
*

vs.
*

Civil No. 914900057
COURT OF APPEALS #

BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN,
Defendant/Appellee.

Pursuant

*
*

to Utah Code Annotated

§21-7-3, I, Barbara

Lynn

Bunch, do solemnly affirm that due to my poverty I am unable to
bear the expenses of the action or legal proceedings which I am
about to commence, and that I believe I am justly entitled to the
relief sought by such action or legal proceedings.

DATED this S ,tk

day of

^

fj) O^JL^^IJUUL^

y
J-uLL

^s

1993.

l^<

BARBARA LYNN BUNCH
Affiant

u iP£3

In the County of <Oivry\nni"i
9>'n

day of

\ irA)P/rYlu£(

notary, personally appeared

, State of Utah, on this

19S3, before me, the
TSafhryr(X

who is personally known to me or:

undersigned

Linn

"who proved to me her identity

through documentary evidence in the form o^ a ljk\)l ^MU\ lp.'V^Q%
to be the person who signed the preceding document in my presence
and who swore or affirmed to me tnat the signature

is voluntary

and the document truthful.
"AKY PL

3L'C

4&S&
^fcSA SIBERIANS
:.Y,v!! £VT;\ tt»i <~S< AVE. ?0. dOX 16
j?['^.".i-.Vj3}
PAKK Cn* b%^ f .34060
V'X^riV v>
CCMM.3:.C : £* P'PiS
LT-H

My Commission Exoires

.w)tA\5

//u.

-^&A<

Residing a t : ^,utYrH{J

r

(^tn^CT

'AQfl
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FILED
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT

' 9 3 NOU 10 PH 12 33
IRON COUNTY

BY

j£<L^

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
By: Stephen W. Julien, Bar No. 1765
216 South 200 West
P.O. Box 1538
Cedar C i t y , Utah 84720
Telephone:
(801) 586-2571
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l a n t

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BARBARA LYNN BUNCH,
PIai nti ff/Appe11 ant,
vs.
BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN,
Defendant/Appel1ee.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF

)

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING
IMPECUNIOSITY REQUEST

Civil No. 914900057
COURT OF APPEALS #

ss,
COMES NOW Barbara Lynn

Bunch, upon being duly

sworn,

deposes and says:
1.

I am indi gent and bel ieve that I am entitled to file

papers at the Fifth District Court without paying filing fees.
2.

I am employed

earn at the rate of $_
hour, day, week, month.

by

UIA <?.y*\ rft (o^pX

, and

per (please circle one)

3.

I received as my last income tne sum of $ / ,A^[ ./ ^

which was my pay for the period of
0^£^-

X^io.ij

4.

IP/ft-

(OfAZ

Th?^

^0 A /

/ 0/ °[

O&ru^cfC

, 1992.

I earned the sum total of $

\}Cco

,

during the calendar year 1992.
5.

I

am

6.

I receive unemployment/workers compensation in the

following amounts:
7.

unemployed

$ {P\\\

r^ae-vo^

and

have

\J0rkgr5

been

0 ,<D^IQ .

C

since

L cLo^i"" /<v

I receive no income from employment, unemployment,

compensation or workers compensation, I am supocrted by:

vehicles:

8.

I own the following real property:

9.

I own the following automoDiles or other motor

ft&D

10.

S ^U

I own the following personal property:
a)

Firearms:

"

b)

Boats:

c)

S p o r t i n g goods:

d)

Jewelry:

\K S

o? &Q?r\jg.ry

siCtYs

(QQC^A^M'A

nffs^

U*U~U

e) Other:
11.

I have bank accounts with
a) Savings account:

Q
0v

^i

D)

Checking account:

c)

Other:

l"~v"f e > V " i P e c ^ f Y N i

LJ)c^(<

The balance in each of the accounts are:
a) Savings:

Q

b) Checking: 4
* [ 1 Co
13.

My m a r i t a l s t a t u s i s :

S ivy#L

14.

My dependents by name and age are:

D
15.

My monthly expenses are as follows:

a)

Rent or house payment

$

b)

Food and household:

$ .

c)

Electricity:

$ . t •vcj cid <tcL

d)

Gas:

$ .. ^c„'M,d<. 4.

e)

Water, Sewer, Garbage, etc.

$

f)

Clothing:

$

9)

Monthly debt payments (list)

$

^UP
1

1 nc

QQ**

UUi.
_3

$
$
$
$

16.
correct.

The financial statement provided herein is true and

In order
Q

to

complete

this

statement,

I have

added

(enter number of pages) additional pages.
17.

I understand that I am submitting and signing this

Affidavit on penalty of perjury.

This means that if I have given

3

047
J u I C I)

false information in this Affidavit I could be prosecuted for other
offenses against the State of Utah.
DATED this 3 &L day of

yj £f\j-Q-W^K
r^^^W^

1993

/

Barbara Lyqjj- Bun'ch, Affiant
In the County of QIk/yy\/rn^A^\
n

day of

\\)np/ry\hg.f

notary, personally appeared

, State of Utah, on this

1993, before me, the undersigned
,Qxrbo.fC>, Urn Q QVKOCV^

who is personally known to me or:

"who proved to me her identity

through documentary evidence in the form cf a \j^.PL, 1*4 \fAlo?>is>%
to be the person who signed the preceding document in my presence
and who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is voluntary
and the document truthful.
NOTARY PLBi'C
TtkSSA SLNDEKUNO
A / ^ ^ A V - \

<3 '-*&*?k\
\ < \ V - Vr .{7
v - . . ,•*/

1S14 M K

AVE.

P.O. BOX 1650

PAW a™ ^ T A ^ &W60
COMMISSION EXPIRES
JULY 5, 1997
sw\ or LT\H

NOTA

^Z^£

Re s i d i n g - a t : ^ ^ . ^ J f

j_oetu^L

My Commission Expires:

4

0 u 04fc

